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The Puerto Rican Colonial Matrix:  
The Etiology of Citizenship—An 
Introduction
PEDRO CABÁN
The author (pcaban@albany.edu) is Professor of Latin American, Caribbean and U.S. Latino Studies 
at the University at Albany, and Director of Graduate Programs. He is author of Constructing a 
Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898–1932 (Westview Press, 1999). Cabán has 
written extensively on the political economy of colonialism in Puerto Rico, and the history and role 
of race and ethnic studies in higher education, among other subjects. His most recent publication is 
“Critical Junctures and Puerto Rican Studies,” in Latino(a) Research Review (2011–12). 
ABSTRACT
The extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico has been the object of voluminous 
scholarly and legal research. The present essay serves as both an introduction to and 
analysis of the four articles that comprise this special issue of CENTRO Journal. Each 
of the articles employs a di!erent analytical lens to focus on the intersecting dimen-
sions of citizenship, colonialism, and empire. The essay identifies common themes 
among the articles with the aim of presenting a unified narrative of the individual 
contributions. It historicizes the study of Puerto Rican citizenship status by reviewing 
the modalities of political exclusion the U.S. practiced against racialized populations 
as it built an “Empire of Freedom” founded on a belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority. 
Also, the essay begins to elaborate a common theoretical framework to hypothesize 
how demographic changes, national strategic and security concerns, and shifts in the 
domestic and international political economy influenced the formation of U.S. citizen-
ship policy toward Puerto Rico. [Key words: U.S. citizenship, Puerto Rico, colonialism, 
imperialism, Jones Act, 1917]
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Of all the unresolved or contested legal issues inherent in U.S. colonial rule in Puerto 
Rico, citizenship has also been unquestionably the most litigious. Congress and the 
U.S. federal court system have accorded a remarkable amount of time and resources to 
the issue of extending U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico. Not surprisingly, the citizenship 
status of Puerto Ricans has been the subject of abundant scholarly literature and legal 
analysis. I venture to say that no single feature of Puerto Rico’s colonial experience has 
garnered such attention. 
The four articles that comprise this special issue demonstrate the continued inter-
est the subject generates. The articles revisit the complicated legal and political history 
of the extension of U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico. However, each article attempts to 
contribute to this copious body of intellectual production by focusing a new analytical 
lens on the multiple dimensions of citizenship, and its intersections with empire, race, 
and representation. The themes addressed in these articles are distinctive, and each 
article raises intriguing insights about the development of the U.S. state as an imperial 
power during the American century.
Jacqueline Font-Guzmán discusses the cases of Puerto Ricans who renounced 
their U.S. citizenship in order to affirm a distinctive Puerto Rican nationality. This act 
of resistance is an affirmation of cultural nationalism by “remaking the Puerto Rican” 
as an agent whose identity is not contingent on validation by a foreign power. Charles 
Venator-Santiago undertakes a legal history of the extension of U.S. citizenship to 
Puerto Rico, and describes the unusual citizenship legislation Congress enacted “in 
order to affirm the inclusive exclusion of Puerto Ricans” within a developing global 
empire. Rick Baldoz and César Ayala explore the paradoxical inconsistency in U.S. 
colonial policy: Why did Congress treat Filipinos so differently than it did Puerto 
Ricans? The authors describe a U.S. Congress vexed with expanding the geographic 
reach of the empire and obsessed with denying the colonial subject admission into the 
body politic. Edgardo Meléndez documents the importance of “alien exclusion” in the 
construction of citizenship. By defining Puerto Ricans as “aliens” both legally and in 
racial/cultural terms, Congress acted to prevent Puerto Rico’s incorporation into the 
U.S. He further argues that “alien exclusion” is at the heart of a “colonial citizenship” 
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that applies exclusively to Puerto Ricans. Collectively, the authors have scrutinized 
the Congressional debates and Supreme Court hearings and opinions pursuant to 
extending citizenship to Puerto Rico and in the process generate new insights into the 
making of the American empire. 
The four studies address a number of common themes that I will discuss in more 
detail in the following pages. However, I want to highlight themes that are consistent 
among the articles. First, the racialization of Puerto Ricans as inherently inferior to the 
Anglo-Saxon colonizer figured decisively in the federal government’s machinations 
to exclude Puerto Ricans from the body politic. Although gradually, the government’s 
reliance on explicitly racist depictions to legalize Puerto Rican’s exclusion may have sub-
sided, the shibboleth of their cultural incompatibility and “alien” nature was concocted 
to deprive Puerto Ricans of full citizenship. The U.S. was perpetually plagued by an 
imperial thirst to retain Puerto Rico as a strategic territorial possession and by a determi-
nation to devise legal fictions to disenfranchise its inhabitants. The papers compellingly 
make the case that by denying Puerto Ricans full citizenship, the U.S. was conveying its 
refusal to recognize the legitimacy of their claims for equality. As each of the authors 
suggests, the U.S. was aware that granting 14th Amendment citizenship rights to the 
inhabitants of Puerto Rico was no symbolic act. If conferred full citizenship, Puerto 
Ricans would have the capacity to actualize their cultural nationalism into a political 
force that would undermine the racist underpinnings of the U.S. imperial project. 
Jacqueline Font-Guzmán discusses the “beliefs and experiences of Puerto Ricans” 
who assert their Puerto Rican cultural national identity by renouncing U.S. citizenship. 
The article goes beyond the goal of “sharing narratives,” on the ways in which Puerto 
Ricans have chosen to “negate U.S. citizenship,” and seeks to illustrate that citizen-
ship is a “subjective experience that leads to agency.” Whether “citizenship leads to 
agency,” as the author states, is an intriguing proposition, but may in fact be impossible 
to theoretically sustain. Given the highly visible struggles of disenfranchised undocu-
mented immigrants in the U.S. to gain citizenship, an equally plausible proposition is 
that denial of citizenship leads to agency, as people claim the rights denied them but 
granted to others during a different historical moment. 
Font-Guzmán analyzes the multiple meanings of citizenship as experienced by 
Puerto Ricans who have petitioned the federal government for a Certificate of Loss of 
Nationality. Citizenship is alternatively treated as a legal construct, a subjective expe-
rience, a cultural identity, and an instance of political nationalism. While the author 
navigates among the various dimensions of Puerto Rican citizenship, she emphasizes 
seminal legal cases to demonstrate how Puerto Ricans seek to construct and sustain 
their nationality as a distinctive identity separate from that of U.S. citizenship. Her 
7The Puerto Rican Colonial Matrix: The Etiology of Citizenship • Pedro Cabán
analysis reveals how by renouncing U.S. citizenship Puerto Rican independentistas 
exposed the inconsistencies and contradictions of colonial rule. But more importantly, 
she reveals that the act of renouncing U.S. citizenship and asserting Puerto Rican 
citizenship is not solely a legal matter. The logic-defying rationale employed by the 
federal courts to deny these certificates has created an opportunity for multiple levels 
of resistance to U.S. possession of Puerto Rico.
The very process of legally renouncing U.S. citizenship requires Puerto Ricans to  
submit to the laws of the very colonial authority whose legitimacy over Puerto  
Rico they do not acknowledge.
Although Font-Guzmán does not discuss it, readers may be struck by the irony that 
in petitioning the federal government for a Certificate of Loss of Nationality, Puerto 
Rican independence advocates acknowledge the legal authority, and thus legitimacy, 
of the U.S. courts to rule on their political status. The very process of legally renounc-
ing U.S. citizenship requires Puerto Ricans to submit to the laws of the very colonial 
authority whose legitimacy over Puerto Rico they do not acknowledge. This exercise 
in defiance of a colonial authority is profoundly contradictory; the very process of 
negation of a foreign sovereignty requires acknowledgement of that sovereignty. This 
is an interesting conundrum, but is so characteristic of the contradictions, absurdities, 
and profound ambiguities of the distinctly U.S. model of colonial rule that has been 
imposed on Puerto Rico. The federal government’s presumption that Puerto Rico has 
slid into a politically somnolent stage comfortable with its “Commonwealth status,” 
has been periodically disrupted by defiant acts that reveal the durability of Puerto 
Rican nationalism. These acts take the form of legal charges filed by petitioners to 
compel defendants (usually an executive agency) to appear before the federal courts. 
While the Puerto Ricans filing these charges fully expect an adverse judgment, they 
nonetheless compel the federal courts to return to the bothersome task of reasserting 
to the world that Puerto Rico is a territorial possession whose inhabitants are denied 
the internationally recognized right of self-determination. 
As further context, it should be noted that an autonomous nation-state possesses 
sovereign authority to determine the conditions of membership in the polity, and it 
establishes the process through which such political membership is secured. The 
federal government does not acknowledge that the people of Puerto Rico have a 
separate nationality. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens who happen to reside in Puerto 
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Rico. In other words, the citizens of Puerto Rico acting through their government 
are prohibited from determining the membership of their polity. Although the 
government of Puerto Rico does issue Certificates of Puerto Rican Citizenship, the 
conditions for issuance of this document must be in compliance with federal law and 
the Constitution. The government cannot deprive a U.S. citizen who does not sign a 
Certificate of Puerto Rican Citizenship the benefits, rights, and privileges that accrue 
to the signatories of that document. 
Despite its effort to portray Puerto Rican citizenship as a distinctive attribute, the 
Puerto Rican Supreme Court acknowledged its legal limitations in Ramírez v. Mari Brás:
This citizenship is not the national citizenship of an independent state, but neither does it 
signify mere domicile. It is the one that corresponds to a political collectivity that forms 
part of a federal system, in which dual citizenship is inherent. (Author’s translation)
The court’s action was consistent with the Supreme Court ruling in Saenz v. Roe 
that citizenship in a state is a matter of constitutional law. State citizenship is defined 
as residence in a state (Schuck 2000: 223). Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
various Supreme Court rulings have established the inviolability of the principle that 
rights extended to some citizens cannot be denied to others.1 
Notions of Puerto Rican nationhood are complicated by the fact that it is a nation-
hood that exists in a physical space over which the Puerto Rican government does not 
exercise sovereignty. Any citizen of the U.S. can settle in Puerto Rico and be entitled to 
the same rights and privileges of a native Puerto Rican who has lived his or her entire 
life on the island. 
The federal government does not recognize Puerto Rican citizenship as a distinctive 
nationality that is independent of U.S. citizenship. In a 1998 case that is also relevant 
to Font-Guzmán’s study, Alberto O. Lozada Colón petitioned the Supreme Court to 
overturn the State Department’s decision to deny his petition for renunciation of U.S. 
citizenship. Lozada Colón argued “that Puerto Rico is a distinct and separate entity with 
an independent national history and identity” and he challenged “the Secretary of State’s 
position that renunciation of U.S. citizenship must entail renunciation of Puerto Rican 
citizenship as well.” The Court concurred with the State Department’s reasoning that 
the legal right to reside in the U.S. is inherent in U.S. nationality, “unless the renunciant 
demonstrates that residence will be as an alien properly documented under U.S. law.” In 
this instance, according to the federal government, Puerto Rico is part of the U.S.2 
Font-Guzmán provides a good overview of contemporary instances in which stra-
tegically positioned colonized citizens deftly exposed the absurdity of Puerto Rico’s 
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so-called autonomy. By renouncing U.S. citizenship, Puerto Ricans not only rejected a 
“foreign” citizenship that is imposed on the residents of the nation, they also embraced 
an alternative culturally and linguistically identifiable nationality. Federal law recog-
nizes a territorially based U.S. citizenship that is distinctive only in that the political 
rights of the residents of Puerto Rico are different from those of U.S. citizens who 
reside in states that comprise the union. But it is citizenship that is diminished. It is a 
lesser, debased citizenship reserved for the subjects of a colony. 
Puerto Rican independence advocates have challenged colonialism in the U.S. 
courts, with the knowledge that their petitions will ultimately fail to alter the status 
quo. Why engage in this seemingly futile exercise? The objective is to turn the legal 
infrastructure of colonialism on its head, that is, to use the legal instruments that sus-
tain colonialism to expose its injustices, particularly the denial of equality to Puerto 
Ricans. While renouncing U.S. citizenship is ultimately a symbolic act, it is indispens-
able for sustaining Puerto Rican nationalism. As Font-Guzmán suggests, renunciation 
is a form of resistance to colonialism that is included in the substantial archive of acts 
of defiance that sustains Puerto Rico’s cultural nationalism. 
Charles Venator-Santiago provides a legal history of the evolving citizenship status 
of individuals born in Puerto Rico and explores the relationship between citizenship 
and distinctive moments in the development of empire. By historizing and contextual-
izing the link between colonial citizens and imperial projects, he postulates a series of 
structural determinants of U.S. citizenship legislation. In other words, congressional 
legislation on the “civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants” of Puerto 
Rico is a component of a systemic response by the U.S. state and capital to changes at 
the global level. This is a novel approach that subsumes discrete explanations for U.S. 
colonial policies—such as the citizenship status of subject populations—under a theory 
of global capitalist expansion.
Venator-Santiago proposes a relationship between legal constructions of citizen-
ship and distinct phases in the development of the U.S. empire. The author links 
the type of U.S. citizenship Congress legislated for Puerto Ricans to distinctive 
“traditions” of empire building: colonialism, imperialism, and global expansionism. 
He also identifies three distinct types of statutory citizenship that Congress has 
conferred on Puerto Ricans, each seemingly granting Puerto Ricans a progressively 
more secure political status. 
Venator-Santiago distinguishes colonialism from imperialism, arguing that the for-
mer was premised on territorial annexation, while the latter was based on acquisition 
“through mere occupation.” He discusses the constitutional basis the U.S. government 
employed to legislate different citizenship statuses for people living in annexed ter-
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ritories (incorporated) and for those living in occupied territories (unincorporated). 
Specifically, he notes that “the colonial tradition” treated territories as “a constitution-
al part of the definition of the U.S.,” while the “imperialist tradition” treated occupied 
territories as situated “outside of the jurisdiction of the U.S.” Puerto Rico, according 
to Venator-Santiago, is in the latter category, and for this reason Congress was not 
legally obligated to extend full 14th Amendment citizen rights to Puerto Rico. Under 
the provisions of the territorial clause, the U.S. could impose indefinite military rule 
in Puerto Rico.3
Puerto Rico manifests the classic syndrome of colonialism: incorporated into the empire, 
but not part of the empire.
As do the other authors in this issue, Venator-Santiago shows that an embedded 
racist logic of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority, which entailed the racialization of 
Puerto Ricans as inherently inferior, was manifestly decisive in Congress’s decision 
to deny them citizenship rights to participate as equal members in the polity during 
much of the twentieth century. He employs the term “inclusive exclusion” to describe 
how Congress strategically deployed U.S. citizenship to include “island-born Puerto 
Ricans” as colonial subjects of the “U.S. global Empire,” while excluding them from 
the citizenship protections and privileges of the 14th Amendment.4 Venator-Santiago’s 
use of inclusive exclusion is suggestive of the concept, expressed by Justice White in 
Bidwell v. Downes, that Puerto Rico “was foreign to the United States in a domestic 
sense.” Puerto Rico manifests the classic syndrome of colonialism: incorporated into 
the empire, but not part of the empire. Through their labor and lives, Puerto Ricans 
have been extensively involved in U.S. state-orchestrated foreign policy adventures 
and have been fully absorbed into the national economy. But as Venator-Santiago 
observes, Puerto Ricans have been denied full participation in the polity that controls 
their destiny. His discussion of inclusion and exclusion captures the enduring paradox 
of Puerto Rico’s colonial situation.
Venator-Santiago notes that the “fragility of the statutory citizenship extended 
to the island,” has remained unaltered ever since the U.S. acquired Puerto Rico. 
Underlining this “fragility” is the Supreme Court decision in Rogers v. Bellei that 14th 
Amendment citizenship applies only to persons born or naturalized in the U.S. The 
Court reaffirmed Congress’s constitutional authority under the Citizenship Clause of 
the 14th Amendment to determine the status of a person born outside the U.S.5 Can 
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Puerto Ricans overcome “the constitutional inferiority” of their statutory U.S. citizen-
ship through naturalization (Perez 2008)? The Court decided that since they already 
possess U.S. citizenship, Puerto Ricans are excluded from the naturalization provisions 
of the 14th Amendment. 
Venator-Santiago’s discussion of the relationship between shifting legal definitions 
of U.S. citizenship as applied to “island-born Puerto Ricans” and the evolution of the 
U.S. as a global power is a novel approach that will stimulate new research on Puerto 
Rico’s enduring coloniality. However, the explanatory utility of his approach might be 
sharpened if changes in citizenship legislation were more explicitly linked to definable 
historical periods, rather than subsumed under major reconfigurations of the state-
capital nexus. Two examples illuminate my point. For over a decade before U.S. entry 
into World War I, Puerto Rican independence activism proved particularly frustrating 
for colonial administrators. The Bureau of Insular Affairs of the War Department was 
among the first government agencies to call for U.S. citizenship for Puerto Ricans. The 
BIA argued that the imposition of U.S. citizenship would signal to independence forces 
that the U.S. would not relinquish its sovereignty over Puerto Rico. 
In 1917, on the eve of U.S. entry into the European War, Governor Arthur Yager 
emphasized the colonial logic behind the extension of citizenship: “the fact that we 
make them citizens of the United States simply means that we have determined practi-
cally that the American flag will never be lowered in Puerto Rico” (Cabranes 1979: 82). 
A strategic priority for the U.S., before it embarked on war in Europe, was to impose 
political stability in its Puerto Rican colony by undermining the independence forces 
(Cabán 1999: 191–4, 201–3).
The 1940 Nationality Act, which contained provisions that explicitly applied to 
Puerto Rico, is another instance in which foreign policy and citizenship policy are 
intertwined. What explains the timing and possible motivations for the U.S. govern-
ment to codify its diverse national laws into a comprehensive code at that moment? 
Various provisions of the Nationality Act were motivated by national security concerns 
at a time when U.S. leaders were convinced of the inevitability of the nation’s entry 
into World War II. The law included a provision for Loss of Nationality and specified 
a lengthy list of particular offenses that could result in the revocation of U.S. citizen-
ship. Like the Jones Act of 1917, the Nationality Act of 1940 was enacted when Europe 
was engulfed in war. 
Rick Baldoz and César Ayala have written an informative study on one of the 
most vexing problems confronting the U.S. after acquiring Spain’s former colonies: to 
“enlarge the geographic borders of the imperial polity without necessarily expanding 
the boundaries of national citizenship.”6 They examine the contentious congressional 
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debates and court rulings pursuant to the defeat of Spain and the cession of its terri-
tories to the U.S. in 1898. They observe that “the evolution of colonial policy in Puerto 
Rico and the Philippines complicates our understanding of how borders and national 
communities were made and remade in the age of U.S. empire.” The authors look at the 
historical record in an effort to understand “the paradoxical treatment of the Filipinos 
and Puerto Ricans during the early decades of American rule.” U.S. policy toward over-
seas territories acquired from Spain “was inconsistent from one territory to another,” 
resulting in “different formulas of partial incorporation.” After the Treaty of Paris, the 
U.S. adopted a “gradated process” of “bordering” the nation. 
Since Congress was not bound to apply the Constitution to the territories, its  
authority to determine the political and civil rights of the inhabitants was  
exempted from judicial review.
The authors highlight the importance of “racial and demographic differences 
between the two colonies” to explain the U.S. government’s differential treatment 
of the colonies. In support of the authors’ point is the action by Congress to register 
its profound contempt for the Philippines as negotiations were taking place in Paris. 
The week before the Treaty of Paris was signed, Congress enacted a joint resolution 
to permanently exclude Filipinos from the America polity. The resolution proclaimed 
that the Treaty “is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands 
into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said 
islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States” (New York Times 1899). 
Indeed, “Congress was loath to establish a constitutional precedent in its treatment of 
Puerto Rico that would apply to the Philippines. It was determined to devise different 
colonial policies for Puerto Rico and the Philippines” (Cabán 1999: 88). Representative 
William E. William exposed the government’s cynicism regarding the political rights 
of the people of the Philippines and Puerto Rico when he remarked, “I understand 
full well that the Administration does not care a fig for Puerto Rico,” and asserted that 
the Foraker Act “is not for the mere sake of deriving revenue from the island, but as a 
precedent for our future guidance and control of the Philippines.” Secretary of State 
Elihu Root was opposed to extending the Constitution to the inhabitants of the over-
seas territories. He opined “that the people of the islands have no right to have them 
treated as States, or to have them treated as territories previously held by the United 
States” (Cabán 1999: 88–9). Since Congress was not bound to apply the Constitution 
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to the territories, its authority to determine the political and civil rights of the inhabit-
ants was exempted from judicial review. The Insular Cases ultimately reaffirmed that 
Congress had the constitutional authority to treat the colonies differently. 
I would historicize Baldoz and Ayala’s thesis by pointing out that the legal debacle 
after the cession of the insular territories in 1898 was not the first occasion in which 
the U.S. debated the liminal issue of transitioning to a different phase of empire build-
ing. In the late eighteenth century, U.S. leaders envisaged the nation’s continuous 
westward continental expansion, to wit, Thomas Jefferson’s “Empire of Liberty.” 
They realized that their imperial ambitions would invariably require the acquisition 
either through purchase of the Spanish territories of Mexico or war. In 1846, the U.S. 
went to war against the Republic of Mexico. In the aftermath of the Mexican defeat, 
the federal government had to contend with the reality that demography could limit 
the nation’s territorial ambitions. Given its decisive military victory, the U.S. could 
potentially annex the whole of Mexico and its people. But the Polk administration 
feared the adverse effects for the American polity of politically incorporating this 
large population. A partisan and ideologically divided Congress debated whether all 
of Mexico should be annexed to the Union, as it fretted over the citizenship status of 
the inhabitants of the territories to be annexed. While Democrats called for annexing 
all of Mexico, the Whigs warned of the dangers of incorporating the Mexican popula-
tion into the U.S. polity. A representative from Vermont echoed a popular fear that the 
U.S. could not possibly incorporate eight million unassimilable Mexicans: “We should 
destroy our own nationality by such an act. We shall cease to be the people we are.” 
The Polk administration shared these views. Secretary of State James Buchanan asked, 
“How should we govern the mongrel race that inhabits [Mexico]?”. Senator John C. 
Calhoun proclaimed, “we have never dreamt of incorporating into our Union any but 
the Caucasian race—the free white race.” He joined Buchanan in rejecting any notion 
that the U.S. could “incorporate a people so dissimilar from us in every respect so 
little qualified for free and popular government without the disruption of our institu-
tions” (Horsman 1981: 241). Half a century later, xenophobic U.S. government officials 
uttered virtually identical racial caricatures about Filipinos and Puerto Ricans. 
The Polk administration ultimately chose a less demographically threatening path: 
it forced Mexico to relinquish half of its national territory, which was populated by 
approximately 80,000 Mexican and an undetermined number of Native Americans 
(Nostrand 1975). The population in the conquered territories was sufficiently small 
and so widely dispersed that it posed little threat to the integrity of the Anglo-Saxon 
breed. Article IX of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which formally ended the 
Mexican American War, stipulated that while Mexicans “shall be incorporated into the 
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Union,” they would be “admitted at the proper time (to be judged by the Congress of 
the United States) to the enjoyment of all the rights of the citizens of the United States 
according to the principles of the Constitution.” 
According to Baldoz and Ayala, the extent and nature of the colonial subjects’ political 
incorporation was defined “on the basis of racial hierarchies.” No doubt the white-black 
racial binary heavily inflected all debates on the political status of alien, foreign-speaking 
peoples who were devoid of superior Anglo-Saxon values. Whether a racial hierarchy 
guided the policy makers’ reasoning on where these populations fit within the polity 
is an intriguing question. However, it is also difficult to accurately gauge variations in 
the depth of racial hostility the U.S. had for Filipinos, Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, Native 
Americans, blacks, and Chinese. Moreover, it is difficult to discern from the record 
whether there was a conscious effort by the U.S. government to devise a scale of human 
revulsion to apply to non-white populations. They were all despised. 
I would also emphasize that policy makers’ racial attitudes toward Puerto Ricans 
and Filipinos were affected by their understanding of America’s westward expansion, 
which was heavily imbued with a continuous and evolving racialist logic that justi-
fied specific exclusionary practices against subject and vanquished people, be they 
enslaved African Americas, displaced Native Americans who were targeted for geno-
cide, Mexicans in the conquered territories who were dispossessed of property and 
rights and converted into a captive labor force or Chinese laborers who were imported, 
deported, and excluded after their labor was no longer of use for American capitalist 
development. America’s savage treatment of non-white populations before the War of 
1898 influenced the federal government’s policies toward Puerto Rico, the Philippines, 
and Cuba. The Insular Cases reveal that the logic for excluding Puerto Ricans and 
Filipinos relied on imaginative legal concoctions based on a peculiar alchemy of 
Anglo-Saxon racial superiority and providential selection, and was well formed before 
the War of 1898. 
After the defeat of Spain, the McKinley administration called on Congress to enact 
legislation to administer the two hugely different overseas possessions. While racial 
considerations are critical for understanding Congress’s different treatment of the two 
colonies, we should not overlook how the prospective roles envisaged for these colo-
nies in the emerging global empire influenced colonial policy. The Philippines were 
critical for the U.S. to gain access to the fabled and internationally contested China 
market. On the Philippines, the U.S. built vital coaling stations that were essential to 
mount a robust naval and commercial presence deep in the Pacific. Puerto Rico was 
a strategic asset necessary for the forward defense of the future trans-isthmian canal, 
and was envisioned as playing a critical role in expanding U.S. commercial interests 
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in Latin America. Puerto Rico, along with Cuba and Hawaii, would emerge as a major 
investment site for U.S. sugar corporations that produced vast quantities of this cheap 
source of calories for an impoverished industrial proletariat.
Edgardo Meléndez has written a meticulously documented and lucid exposition 
of critical debates on the extension of U.S. citizenship to the residents of Puerto Rico 
before the enactment of the Jones Act. He has compiled and analyzed a comprehen-
sive array of primary and seminal secondary sources to interrogate the tortured logic, 
legal and otherwise, that characterized the heated and protracted congressional and 
Supreme Court deliberations on citizenship for Puerto Rico. Meléndez introduces the 
concept of “alien exclusion” to demonstrate how embedded notions of Anglo-Saxon 
exceptionalism and racial superiority were constitutive of legal opinions leading to 
the exclusion of Puerto Ricans as fully vested citizens of the U.S. He emphasizes the 
importance of “alien exclusion” as a driving, but unexplicated, principle that perme-
ated these debates. Meléndez makes a compelling case that excluding aliens from the 
body politic, and constructing a legal edifice for denying aliens constitutional rights 
and privileges, were critical elements of an unfolding imperial project. 
The U.S. imperial venture took the form of a uniquely American commercial expansion 
under the watchful eye of a bellicose central government determined to wrest new  
overseas markets for its emerging multinational enterprises. 
I would augment his analysis by noting that the debates over the political and civil 
rights of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico and the Philippines were incidental to a larger 
preoccupation. After the Civil War, the U.S. had transcended the formative stage of 
incorporating territory on the continent into the union. On the eve of the new century, 
the U.S. was anxious to embark on global imperialist adventure and ready to rival long-
established European powers and a heavily militarized Japan with regional territorial 
ambitions. But, in contrast to its rivals, the U.S. did not envisage expropriating huge 
swaths of foreign lands, occupying them militarily, and directly ruling them as colonial 
possessions. The U.S. imperial venture took the form of a uniquely American commer-
cial expansion under the watchful eye of a bellicose central government determined to 
wrest new overseas markets for its emerging multinational enterprises. 
The outcome of the legal wrangling over the civil and political rights of the inhabit-
ants of the expropriated possessions of Spain would determine the political destiny 
not only of these subject populations, but also of the inhabitants of future territories 
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the U.S. might acquire through conquest or treaty. The backdrop for congressional 
debates and Supreme Court rulings was the reconceptualization of the Constitution as 
the constitutive document for building an Anglo-Saxon Empire of Liberty, and turn-
ing into an expansive legal device to empower the U.S. to hold territories populated 
by alien peoples in perpetuity, while denying them the right to participate as equal 
members in the American polity. These possessions and their inhabitants were vital 
to the emerging empire. U.S. firms coveted the subject population’s cheap labor power 
and the possessions abundant natural resources, envisioning the possessions as highly 
lucrative captive markets for capitalist production. 
 The founders of the Constitution had decisively relegated the black slave to a 
marginal status, and envisioned either the extermination or displacement of Native 
Americans that impeded Anglo-Saxon exploitation of the new nation’s natural 
resources. As I noted earlier, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was the first instance in 
which Congress dealt with the incorporation of the inhabitants of territories acquired 
from a foreign nation. However, the citizenship status of Mexicans in the ceded ter-
ritories did not generate much controversy. Congress essentially procrastinated and 
decided that at a future date it would determine when the Mexicans under its sover-
eignty would be granted the rights of U.S. citizenship. The systematic, unrelenting, and 
ruthless campaign to eradicate the political, social, and legal power of Mexicans who 
chose to remain in the ceded territories made the issue of their citizenship irrelevant. 
Puerto Rico was a totally different case, with close to a million inhabitants living on 
a tropical island that was virtually unknown to the American populace and its rep-
resentatives in Congress. The Philippines, with a population of almost eight million, 
was a greater menace to a nation committed to preserving its whiteness. The Treaty 
of Guadalupe Hidalgo did commit the federal government to grant Mexicans the same 
rights as U.S. citizens, although it did not stipulate when it would do so. In contrast, the 
Treaty of Paris of 1898 did not obligate the U.S. to extend citizenship to the inhabitants 
of the insular territories. The Treaty crisply stated, “the civil rights and political status 
of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be 
determined by the Congress.”
Meléndez’s concept of “alien exclusion” could be used as a lens to view the fed-
eral government’s facile corruption of liberal ideals enshrined in the Constitution. 
The resolution of the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans was never a matter of 
dispassionate legal reasoning grounded in precedence and mindful of the human 
and civil rights enshrined in the Constitution, but a rather churlish affair in which 
the intent was to confine Puerto Ricans and Filipinos to “the periphery of the 
American empire.” 
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Meléndez’s discussion of “alien exclusion” yields another important insight, the 
sui generis citizenship status Congress created for Puerto Ricans, which he labels as a 
“colonial citizenship.” According to Meléndez, Puerto Ricans were not relegated to a 
second-class citizenship. Instead, they were uniquely “colonial citizens.” Citing Balzac 
v. the People of Porto Rico, Meléndez notes that the Supreme Court ruled that “the colo-
nial nature of the territory was sufficient to merit the exclusion of these new citizens 
from full membership and participation in the American polity.”7 His astute distinction 
between second-class citizenship and colonial citizenship is important for a number of 
reasons. The former category is analytically imprecise. It is an amorphous and ambigu-
ous residual category to which all who are not first-class citizens are relegated. Such 
an indiscriminate lumping of citizenship statuses obscures the highly particular forms 
and sources of racial discrimination that have shaped the narrative of U.S. exception-
alism. Diplomatically tucked away in a footnote, Meléndez challenges Rogers Smith’s 
(1997) positioning of Puerto Ricans in a third category of a “four-part hierarchical 
structure of citizenship laws.” Meléndez questions Smith’s depiction of Puerto Ricans 
as second class citizens, who are incapable of exercising an “improvident grant of for-
mal citizenship.” According to Meléndez, “whatever restrictions on citizenship rights 
exist in Puerto Rico are due to the colonial nature of the territory.” In the process, he 
reveals a profound contradiction in how Puerto Ricans were treated by the new colo-
nial authorities. Puerto Ricans were racialized and subjected to an undefined policy 
of “alien exclusion.” But the legal racialization of Puerto Ricans was confined to the 
territory, where they were subjected to a colonial citizenship. Meléndez suggests the 
metamorphosis of the term “alien” as a legal construct into a racial category; in other 
words, “alien” became a substitute for race as applied to Puerto Ricans. 
A hyper-patriotic Congress identified Puerto Ricans as excludable aliens and  
unassimilable wards in retribution for their persistent challenges to the colonial  
regime established by the Foraker Act. 
Conclusion
A deeply held conviction of Anglo-Saxon racial exceptionalism influenced congressional 
action on the political status of the inhabitants of the insular possessions. On the eve of the 
twentieth century, the U.S. political leadership continued to fulsomely express a belief in 
Anglo-Saxon supremacy that the nation’s founders would have heartily embraced. Puerto 
Rico’s durable cultural, religious, and linguistic traits were factors used to rationalize the 
18 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013
exclusion of its people from the U.S. body politic. A hyper-patriotic Congress identified 
Puerto Ricans as excludable aliens and unassimilable wards in retribution for their persis-
tent challenges to the colonial regime established by the Foraker Act. The racial antipathy 
toward Filipinos was more extreme, and they were never granted U.S. citizenship. Until 
Congress granted the Philippines independence in 1946, the residents of the islands were 
classified as Philippine citizens and U.S. nationals. 
The federal government’s reliance on explicitly racist theories to rationalize its 
colonial policies appears to have become more muted during debates pursuant to pas-
sage of the Jones Act. Demographic changes in the U.S. steadily altered the discourse 
on the primacy of Anglo Saxonism. For approximately thirty years, from 1880 through 
1910, unprecedented European immigration demographically transformed the U.S. 
In the face of profound cultural and linguistic changes, Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism 
became increasingly difficult to sustain as a discourse for national unity and imperial 
expansion. By 1910, almost three quarters of immigrants entering the U.S. were from 
Eastern and Southern European countries. Literally scores of millions were technically 
eligible for naturalization; a 14th Amendment citizenship status that was not revocable 
the way statutory citizenship conferred on Puerto Ricans was. The U.S. recognized the 
need to Americanize these immigrants (Cabán 2001). By 1917, the growing presence of 
Irish, Jewish, and Eastern and Southern European immigrant communities chipped 
away at Anglo-Saxons’ political strength in urban centers.
Were Puerto Ricans excluded by the end of the Progressive era from the American body 
politic because they were not white (and thus culturally incompatible) rather than 
because they were not Anglo-Saxon (and thus inherently inferior)?
In would be instructive to examine whether the shifting constructions of Puerto 
Rican citizenship reflected evolutionary changes in the racialist thinking of U.S. policy 
makers as the salience of Anglo-Saxon supremacy slowly gave way to a new vision of 
distinctiveness of a fictionalized superior Caucasian race. Were Puerto Ricans excluded 
by the end of the Progressive era from the American body politic because they were 
not white (and thus culturally incompatible) rather than because they were not Anglo-
Saxon (and thus inherently inferior)? Could this new racialization of the Puerto Rican 
explain in part changes in the type of U.S. citizenship extended to Puerto Rico? 
Congress and the courts portrayed Puerto Ricans as so racially and cultural dif-
ferent as to preclude their full incorporation as citizens. Ironically, the Balzac v Porto 
19The Puerto Rican Colonial Matrix: The Etiology of Citizenship • Pedro Cabán
Rico decision suggests that the presumed cultural incompatibility of Puerto Ricans was 
inconsequential if they chose to reside in the continental U.S. In other words, once they 
were legally residing within the “national borders” of the U.S. polity, the presumed array 
of cultural liabilities that made Puerto Ricans unacceptable appeared to have vanished. 
However, Puerto Ricans living in the U.S. were confined to a statutory citizenship and 
were denied the opportunity to apply for naturalized citizenship. In other words, while 
Puerto Ricans were U.S. citizens, they could not become Americans. Puerto Ricans could 
not overcome their “lack of whiteness” to become full members of the American polity. 
It is significant to note that the author of the Jones Act was adamantly opposed to 
granting Puerto Rico statehood and insisted that conferring U.S. citizenship on  
Puerto Ricans must be unconnected to statehood.
We can only speculate as to why Congress and the Supreme Court struggled so 
mightily to devise a constitutionally valid reason to restrict Puerto Ricans to a statutory 
citizenship. Numerically, Puerto Ricans did not pose a threat to the integrity of American 
culture and civic values. In 1900, the Puerto Rican population numbered approximately 
953,000, barely 1.2 percent of the U.S. population of 76 million. The millions of non-
English-speaking, non-Protestant immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe posed 
a much more viable threat to the U.S. These immigrants were a source of national preoc-
cupation and precipitated virulent nativist reactions.8 Naturally, the problem was not 
that absorbing Puerto Ricans into the body politic as equal citizens threatened American 
institutions and values. The real concern was whether a people who were confined to a 
limited physical space not subject to colonial resettlement by Anglo Americans, who con-
stituted a culturally and linguistically definable group with legal and political institutions 
alien to the U.S., should be allowed to have a collective voice in the shaping of U.S. national 
policy. If Puerto Rico had been incorporated into the union in 1900, it would have been 
the 27th most populated state. With seven representatives and two senators, Puerto Rico 
would have had substantial leverage. It is significant to note that the author of the Jones 
Act was adamantly opposed to granting Puerto Rico statehood and insisted that confer-
ring U.S. citizenship on Puerto Ricans must be unconnected to statehood. Congressman 
William A. Jones warned, “If Porto Rico were admitted to statehood there would be two 
senators and at least half a dozen Porto Rican representatives; and the fear exists that they 
might exercise a decisive influence in the United States Congress and practically enact 
laws for the government of the United States” (Cabán 1999: 201).
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The Supreme Court has relied on demonstrably tortured judicial reasoning and 
manifestly convoluted interpretations of existing law to relegate Puerto Ricans to an 
inferior citizenship. Given how cynically Congress and the courts have employed the 
Constitution to inflict injury on racialized people, it is difficult to discern a morally 
sustainable legal basis for continued denial of full citizenship rights to Puerto Ricans. 
The final decision on Puerto Rico’s territorial status was influenced by a realization 
that incorporating the nation of Puerto Rico would alter the national political land-
scape. Although the U.S. set about to “Americanize” Puerto Ricans, it was apparent to 
colonial officials that Puerto Ricans effectively subverted programs that were ostensi-
bly designed to assimilate them into the dominant culture. The cases of New Mexico 
and Hawaii show that incorporated territorial status and eventual statehood were con-
tingent on the level of whiteness of the population of the state. Annexation as a state of 
the union depended on the white settlers asserting their hegemony over the original 
inhabitants of those territories. But in Puerto Rico, the U.S. confronted the sobering 
reality that the Puerto Rican population could not be displaced. The alternative was 
to rule Puerto Rico as a colonial possession and to create a historically unprecedented 
citizenship status, one that barely survived constitutional scrutiny. These papers dem-
onstrate the lengths to which the federal government has gone to impose a colonial 
citizenship on Puerto Ricans, as well the determination of Puerto Ricans to disrupt 
U.S. colonial administration.
NOTES
1 States do pass laws that restrict actions of its citizenry, but these must be inclusionary. 
Particular categories of citizens would subjected to the same restrictions, i.e., laws against 
underage drinking, electoral residency laws, etc. 
2 Alberto O. Lozada Colon v. Department of State: No. 99–259.
3 The Northwest Ordinance provided for the installation of temporary civilian administrations 
by the central government. These territories were organized into states and eventually admitted 
to the Union. In contrast, the Puerto Rican and the Philippine territories were initially adminis-
tered by an occupying military authority with indefinite tenure.
4 The term is the title of Adi Ophir’s edited book on Israeli occupation of Palestine (2009). 
Agnes Czajka (2005) also used the term in her discussion of punitive high security incarcera-
tion which describes perfectly the psychological torture of Puerto Rican political prisoners in 
federal prisons.
5 “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”
6 Waldinger discusses a similar contemporary challenge for the U.S. He argues that in responding 
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to public calls for controls on immigration, the government’s response “has been to widen formal 
differences between the people of the state and all the other people in the state” (2011: 221).
7 The imperious renaming of Puerto Rico for the convenience of linguistically challenged colo-
nial administrators is yet another callous manifestation of imperial hubris.
8 According to University of Wisconsin Professor Edward A. Ross, who studied European 
immigration, “the blood now being injected into the veins of our people is sub-common.” He 
advocated limiting immigration if the U.S. was to be saved from “race suicide” (Cabán 2001: 27).
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